Trojan phones

It's taken a long time but finally an American newspaper has done extensive reporting on the bizarre mobile phone bugging case in Greece; unfortunately it's a Wall Street Journal article, behind subscription. It explains how the bugging operation required such high level technical capability that very few institutions other than Ericsson and Vodaphone (whose equipment was infiltrated) or a national intelligence agency could have done it.

The key part of the trick was that calls to over 100 phones were simultaneously routed to a set of 14 pre-paid cellphones, so that someone could listen in. It involved a higher level of interception than simply cloning the SIM card of the targeted mobile phones -- so not simply a matter of that cool scene in The Bourne Supremacy. But speaking of US intelligence agencies, here's how the article ends:

ADAE's [Greek telecoms watchdog] technical experts also say the interceptor phones were in contact via phone calls and text messages with various overseas destinations, namely the U.S., including Laurel, Md., the U.K., Sweden and Australia, according to the ADAE preliminary report. Some of these calls and messages were initiated and received directly from the 14 interceptor phones and some were relayed via a second group of at least three other prepaid phones that also were in contact with the 14 interceptor phones.

Some Greek politicians note that one of the U.S.'s principal spy agencies, the National Security Agency, is based near Laurel, Md. The agency recently has been in the spotlight, with some members of the U.S. Congress criticizing the Bush administration for monitoring, without a warrant, calls between people in the U.S. and suspected terrorists overseas. Agency spokesman Don Weber said the "NSA takes its legal responsibilities seriously and operates within the law." As for whether the NSA or other U.S. authorities were involved in the Greek incident, he said the agency doesn't "discuss ongoing or pending investigations."

UPDATE 24 JUNE: The separate revelations about the US Treasury/CIA snooping on international financial transfers includes this detail:

Intelligence officials were so eager to use the Swift data that they discussed having the C.I.A. covertly gain access to the system, several officials involved in the talks said. But Treasury officials resisted, the officials said, and favored going to Swift directly.